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Abstract 
Action recognition  has received an enormous interest in the field of neuroscience over the 
last two decades, with a strong impact also in many other disciplines such as philosophy 
and robotics. In spite of this interest and impressive numbers of publications on this topic, 
the knowledge in terms of fundamental neural mechanisms that provide constraints for 
underlying computations remains rather limited. This fact stands in contrast with a wide 
variety of speculative theories about how action recognition might work, and how it might 
interact with other cognitive brain functions. This review focuses on new fundamental 
electrophysiological results in monkeys, which provide constraints for the detailed 
underlying computations, where we focus particularly on mirror mechanisms and 
interactions between visual and motor processing. In addition, we review models for 
action recognition with concrete mathematical implementations, as opposed to purely 
conceptual models. We think that only such implemented models can be meaningfully 
linked quantitatively to physiological data and have a potential to narrow down the many 
possible computational explanations for action recognition. In addition, only concrete 
implementations allow to judge whether postulated computational solutions are feasible 
and can be implemented with real cortical neurons.  
 
 
Introduction 
Action recognition and its relationship to other cognitive functions has been one of the 
core topics in cognitive neuroscience over the last decade (Keysers, 2011; Keysers and 
Perrett, 2004; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Schutz-Bosbach and Prinz, 
2007). The discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of the monkey (Gallese et al., 
1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) has initiated a wide interest in the neuroscience community for 
action processing and understanding, with implications in many other disciplines of 
neuroscience, including social neuroscience, motor control, body and self-representation, 
body motion perception, and emotion processing. At the same time, action processing and 
understanding in biological systems have become a topic of high interest in other 
disciplines outside neuroscience. This includes, for example, computer vision, robotics 
(e.g. Demiris, 2002; Schaal et al., 2003), and philosophy (e.g. Petit, 1999; Sinigaglia, 2013). 
In spite of the outstanding interest for this topic, the number of publications on the 
electrophysiological basis of action recognition that provide precise constraints for the 
underlying neural and computational mechanisms is still rather limited (cf. e.g. Kilner and 
Lemon, 2013).  
This lack of strongly constraining data, combined with the vivid interest in the 
problem of action recognition and understanding motivated the development of a broad 
spectrum of, partly extremely speculative theoretical accounts of action processing. Many 
of these theories have never been concretely implemented, and have served only as 
frameworks for conceptual discussions. However, considering the complexity of the 
underlying neural and dynamical processes and the high dimensionality of the underlying 
visual and motor patterns, the establishment of valid theories without the help of 
concretely implemented models is very difficult. Likewise, it is almost impossible to falsify 
such conceptual accounts by comparing them with specific experimental results in a 
conclusive manner.  
Action-selective neurons are found in a number of brain structures, including the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), the parietal, the premotor, and the motor cortex. We will 
briefly review here mainly the recent relevant results, focusing especially on a number of 
novel studies on mirror neurons. Much more detailed information about previous studies 
and other action-selective neurons without mirror properties can be found in other 
reviews (Nelissen et al., 2011; Puce and Perrett, 2003; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001). 
Early studies on mirror neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996) reported 
that the responses of some mirror neurons to visual stimulus might depend on specific 
characteristics and modalities of the visual stimulation. However, only recent 
neurophysiological studies have studied these aspects systematically. They have 
investigated how spatial parameters of observed actions influence the activity of mirror 
neurons, including the distance of the action from the observer as well as the perspective 
or stimulus view, i.e. from which direction the action is observed. Moreover, these studies 
show that the mirror neuron discharge intensity is influenced by the value that is 
associated with objects on which the action is performed. We think that such 
parametrically well-controlled studies of the different aspects that influence the activity of 
action-selective neurons, and especially of mirror neurons, are absolutely essential for the 
development of solid computational theories of action perception in the primate cortex. In 
addition, the work of Lemon and his co-workers (see Kraskov et al. 2014) showed that the 
mirror mechanism is not limited to parieto-frontal circuit, but also includes pyramidal 
tract neurons originating from areas F5 and F1 (primary motor cortex). 
As a step towards a deepening of the understanding of the biologically-relevant 
neuro-computational mechanisms of action recognition, we provide also overview of the 
existing computational and neural models that are implemented in a sufficiently concrete 
manner to allow meaningful comparisons with such experimental data. 
 This overview of the existing work reveals several gaps in terms of critical 
experiments that might help to decide between different computational accounts, as well 
as between the available theoretical frameworks, all of which fail to capture some essential 
properties of the neural data. We hope that this analysis will help to set the goals for 
future research in experimental as well as in theoretical neuroscience.  
 
Preliminary remark: different classes of actions  
Before reviewing neurophysiological data on action recognition and discussing related 
models, it is important to stress that actions made by other individuals fall into two main 
categories. One category is constituted by actions that are present in the motor repertoire of 
the observers, and the other by actions that are extraneous to their motor abilities. The 
processing of these two different classes of actions involves partially different neural 
substrates. Both categories of actions activate visual action-selective areas located in the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS), while they differ with respect to the involvement of motor 
structures. To give an example, the observation of biting done by a dog, a monkey or a 
human being activates the same cortical parieto-frontal network in human observers. In 
contrast, the observation of a dog that barks activates visual, but not motor areas (Buccino 
et al., 2004). 
A psychological explanation of these finding has been proposed by Jeannerod. He 
suggested that “mere visual perception, without involvement of the motor system would 
only provide a description of the visible aspects of the movements of the agent, but it 
would not give precise information about the intrinsic components of the observed action 
which are critical for understanding what the action is about, what is its goal, and how to 
reproduce it”. This implies that perception of actions without motor involvement is in 
some sense incomplete. Others have interpreted the motor activation triggered by others’ 
actions in a more mechanistic way, suggesting that the motor activation of the parieto-
frontal network results in a “direct recognition” of the observed action through the 
similarity between the observed and the executed action, not requiring additional complex 
inference processes (direct matching hypothesis) (Rizzolatti et al., 2014). A more recent 
interpretation is that motor activation during action observation represents a prediction 
triggered by the observed stimuli, which is necessary to disambiguate the sensory 
representations emerging during action observation (Kilner, 2011; Kilner et al., 2007; 
Wilson and Knoblich, 2005). Conceptually, this view minimizes, in part, the role of motor 
system in action processing, while stressing instead interactions between visual and motor 
areas for action understanding.   
Another important distinction from a theoretical point of view is the one between 
transitive actions, which are directed towards goal objects, and non-transitive ones without 
such goal objects. It turns out (see Section ‘Example-based visual recognition models’) that 
the processing of transitive actions is computationally more difficult. It requires not only 
the recognition of the effector movement (e.g. the moving hand) but also a processing of 
the relationship between the effector and the goal object (e.g. whether hand and object 
match spatially, or if the correct type of grip is applied to a specific object).  This 
necessitates additional computational mechanisms that relate the movements of the 
effector to the properties of goal objects (e.g. Oztop et al., 2004). 
 
Electrophysiological results  
Due to space limitations the following review of electrophysiological results focuses on a 
few recently established novel aspects of mirror neurons, and properties of action-selective 
neurons that likely provide input to the classical mirror neurons system. An overview of 
the anatomy of the action observation system is given in Figure 1. With respect to a more 
elaborate treatment of previous results on the mirror neuron and action processing system 
we refer to several previous reviews (Puce and Perrett, 2003; Rizzolatti and Craighero, 
2004; Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014).  
 
Basic motor properties of canonical and mirror neurons  
Area F5 contains two main types of neurons responding to visual stimuli: canonical 
neurons and mirror neurons. Canonical neurons are neurons that respond to the 
presentation of three-dimensional objects. Typically, there is congruence between the size 
of the objects that trigger the neuron and the type of grip encoded by that neuron (Murata 
et al., 1997). More recently, Fluet et al. (2010) recorded canonical neuron activity in 
monkeys, instructed by an external context cue to grasp a handle with a precision grip or a 
power grip. In addition, object orientation was varied. The neurons showed a context-
dependent grasp planning activity after cue presentation, and a motor grasp-related 
activity during movement execution. 
 Contrasting with this class of neurons, mirror neurons are a specific set of neurons 
originally described in area F5 in the premotor cortex of the monkey. As all other types of 
neurons in area F5, mirror neurons discharge during goal directed actions such as grasping, 
holding, placing. Their main characteristic is that they respond to the observation of 
actions done by others. This property differentiates them not only from mere motor 
neurons, but also from canonical neurons. The relative proportion of these neuron types 
was investigated in a recent study in which a large number of neurons of F5 were 
recorded using multi-electrode linear arrays. The study reported that out of 479 recorded 
grasping neurons, 221 were purely motor, 197 mirror neurons, including 60 that also 
responded to object presentation, and, finally, 46 were canonical neurons (Bonini et al., 
2014).  
Mirror neurons are also present in monkey parietal areas connected with area F5 
(see below). Their properties appear to be similar to those of mirror neurons in area F5. 
However, detailed comparative studies that assess possible differences between the 
functional properties of parietal and premotor mirror neurons have still to be undertaken. 
In humans, mirror neurons were recorded in mesial motor areas and the hippocampus 
(Mukamel et al., 2010). The recordings were made in surgical patients with drug resistant 
epilepsy. The type of electrodes used (large linear electrodes with low impedance sites on 
the shaft and a bundle of tiny wires at the electrode end for single neuron recording) 
biased, inevitably, the single neurons database towards the medial part of the brain. A 
large body of evidence (including EEG and MEG, TMS, and brain imaging experiments) 
shows, however, that human parietal and premotor areas became active during action 
observation (see Rizzolatti and Fogassi, 2014). These areas closely correspond to those 
active in the monkey during action observation in fMRI experiments (Nelissen et al., 2011). 
These are also the areas where mirror neurons were recorded. Thus, there is little doubt 
that the action execution/action observation circuit of humans houses mirror neurons. 
 
Some newly established  properties of mirror neurons in area F5 
 
a) Influence of the observed action location relative to the observer 
Early studies of mirror neurons were focused on demonstrating congruence between motor 
and visual responses of the recorded neurons (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). 
Already in those studies it was reported, however, that mirror neurons form different 
subcategories according to the visual stimuli that are most effective in triggering them, 
and not all of them showed strong congruency between visual and motor tuning. 
 Different aspects of the visual tuning properties of mirror neurons were addressed 
in the last few years.  One of these aspects was how the spatial location of the observed 
actions influences mirror neurons discharge (Caggiano et al., 2009). The results showed 
that the response of about half of the mirror neurons of area F5 discharged differently 
according to the location in space of the observed motor acts.  Half of them discharged 
more strongly or exclusively to stimuli presented in the monkey peripersonal space, half 
preferred the extrapersonal space. 
  In the same study it was investigated whether space-selective neurons encode 
space in a “metric” or in an “operational” format. “Metric format” indicates that the 
location of effective stimuli was defined in terms of the true geometrical position or  
distance from the monkey. In contrast, space encoding in an “operational format” refers to 
the fact that the effective stimulus location is dependent on the possibility of the monkey 
to interact with the objects, and not on the true physical distance between the monkey and 
observed action. The experiment by Caggiano et al. (2009)  showed that about half of the 
tested space-selective mirror neurons were “operational mirror neurons” while the other 
half encoded the space in a metric way (“Cartesian mirror neurons”).  
To our knowledge, no computational or neural models exists that would capture 
these observed transformations of spatial tuning properties dependent on the operational 
space of the monkey. 
 
b) Modulation of mirror neuron responses by the perspective view of observed actions  
A very interesting recently investigated issue was whether mirror neurons provide 
information concerning the perspective from which the motor acts of others are observed 
(Caggiano et al., 2011). Three perspectives were tested: subjective view (0°), side view (90°) 
and frontal view (180°). The results showed that most tested mirror neurons (74%) were 
view-dependent, their responses being tuned either to one or, more frequently, to two 
specific points of view. Only a minority of the studies neurons (26%) exhibited view-
independent responses, that is their response did not vary significantly with the 
perspective. 
 The observation of view-dependence fits nicely with example-based visual 
recognition mechanisms (see the Section ‘Theoretical models’). However, it has to be noted 
that the same population of neurons can be simultaneously tuned to multiple parameters, 
e.g. to the view and different grip types. In addition, individual neurons can show 
different degrees of invariance with respect to these parameters (see also Singer and 
Sheinberg (2010)).  This type of multi-dimensional tuning is not captured by most existing 
theoretical models, which typically make the simplifying assumption that individual 
modules encode only a specific set of parameters instead of mixing many apparently 
unrelated computational functions. 
 There are two further issues that deserve some discussion here. The first is the 
origin of the input that may determine the properties of view-dependent and view- 
independent F5 mirror neurons. The second is what might be the functional role of these 
two types of mirror neurons. The main input to F5 arises from parietal areas PFG and AIP 
(antero interpatietal area) (see Figure 1). However, there is no detailed information 
available about the properties of these neurons in terms of their view-dependence 
properties. PFG and AIP receive input from various areas located in the superior temporal 
sulcus region. In this region neurons with view-dependent and view-independent 
properties have been described before (Perrett et al., 1985).  
A common explanation for the computational function of view-tuned neuros in the 
visual pathway is that they represent an intermediate step towards view-invariant 
representations (e.g. Perrett and Oram, 1993). View-invariant neurons might pool the 
responses from view-variant ones with selectivity for different views. However, given that 
mirror neurons by definition have well-defined motor tuning properties, and thus are 
motor neurons, this explanation captures only a part of their possible computational role. It 
seems likely that such neurons combine information about the visual perspective of 
perceived actions with associated motor behavior.  
An interesting possibility is, , that view-dependent mirror neurons might be helpful 
within an architecture that combines forward and backwards streams of information 
processing, in order to support feedback from motor representations to purely visual areas, 
e.g. via parietal cortex. Such modulation of bottom-up processing by an interpretation on 
more abstract levels higher up in the processing hierarchy has been repeatedly 
conceptualized, e.g. in the context of Reverse-Hierarchy theory by (Ahissar and Hochstein, 
2004) several years ago. Likewise, this idea forms a central element in theories in computer 
vision (Ullman, 1996) and plays a central role in predictive coding theories on action 
recognition (see Section ‘Bayesian models’).  More empirical data are needed, however, to 
confirm this appealing hypothesis. 
 
c)  Mirror neurons are sensitive for the value of an observed action   
It was originally suggested that mirror neurons describe exclusively the goal of the 
observed action, and that their discharge is not influenced by the properties of the objects 
on which the action is performed, or by the value that this object may have for the monkey. 
A series of recent findings indicate that is not always true. In fact, a set of mirror neuron in 
area F5 has been observed whose discharge was modulated by the value that the grasped 
object had for the monkey (Caggiano et al., 2012). Two experiments demonstrated this 
point. 
  In the first, the discharge of mirror neurons during the observation of an agent, 
who was grasping food, was contrasted with that of the same agent grasping objects 
devoid of any meaning and value for the monkey. It was found that the large majority of 
tested neurons were more strongly activated in the “food” condition. In the second 
experiment, the responses of mirror neurons were studied in response to the observation 
of an agent grasping the same objects, which were either associated with a reward given to 
the monkey or were not rewarded. About 50% of the tested neurons responded more 
strongly when the observed motor acts were performed on rewarded objects, while a 
small percentage showed a stronger response for non-rewarded objects. Finally, the 
discharge of about 40% of neurons was not influenced by the reward conditions. 
At first glance, the influence of the object value on mirror neuron responses is 
rather surprising. However, there is evidence (see below) that one of the nodes of the 
mirror system (parietal area AIP) receives information not only from the lower bank of the 
STS, but also from the inferotemporal lobe, a region that likely encodes the semantics of 
objects. Furthermore, neurons in both orbitofrontal cortex and cingulate sulcus are more 
strongly activated when the monkey anticipates a larger reward (Maunsell, 2004; Roesch 
and Olson, 2003, 2007). It is likely that areas which associate object and reward determine 
the value-related responses of mirror neurons through their output to the premotor areas.  
This again demonstrates that cortical levels of processing cannot be easily mapped 
onto distinct computational steps, like action recognition, motor planning, or the decision 
between different alternative motor programs. Present theoretical frameworks do not 
provide a systematic approach to deal with such fuzzy assignments of computational 
functions to anatomical levels.    
 
Action observation circuit: the input to the premotor cortex 
The functional properties of STS neurons strongly suggest that these neurons provide  the 
fundamental cortical visual input to mirror neurons. This hypothesis was recently 
confirmed by (Nelissen et al., 2011) using fMRI techniques, complemented by 
neuroanatomical tracing. Monkeys were presented with different types of hand grasping 
actions. Activations were found in three cortical regions: STS, inferior parietal lobule, and 
the premotor region. A subsequent analysis, carried out using as region of interest (ROI) the 
parietal cytoarchitectonically defined areas PF, PFG, PG and AIP, showed activation only 
in areas PFG and AIP. No action-specific activation was found in the other parietal areas. 
A subsequent connectivity study showed that the two parietal “mirror” areas are linked 
with different sectors of STS. Area PFG is connected with the upper bank of STS, and in 
particular with area STPm. In contrast, AIP is mostly connected with the lower bank of STS, 
and in particular with its most rostral subdivisions (see Figure 1). Note that the temporal 
input to AIP originates not only from STS lower bank, but also from cortex that is part the 
inferotemporal lobe. These finding is of great interest because it indicates that the mirror 
network has access to information concerning object semantics. Such semantics defines, 
for example, classes of objects that are associated with the same type of grip.   
Unlike mirror neurons the neurons in the STS do not have motor properties, but 
respond to visual action stimuli (Oram and Perrett, 1996; Perrett et al., 1989). Recent 
studies on the neural encoding of observed actions in the STS showed that this area 
contains many view-dependent neurons (Barraclough et al., 2009; Vangeneugden et al., 
2011). This seems consistent with the idea that the view-dependence in mirror neurons 
might result from their afferent visual inputs. Finally, many STS neurons show temporal 
sequence selectivity and seem to associate the information of stimulus patterns over time 
(Barraclough et al., 2009; Singer and Sheinberg, 2010; Vangeneugden et al., 2011). Some of 
these neurons show tuning for actor identity (Singer and Sheinberg, 2010). In addition, the 
similarity of the neural activation patterns of STS neurons match closely the physical 
similarity between the encoded action patterns (Vangeneugden et al., 2009). STS neurons 
encode thus many aspects of actions regardless of whether those actions belong to the 
observer motor repertoire. They do not show, however, the motor properties that 
characterize premotor and parietal mirror neurons. 
 
 
 
Action observation circuit: the mirror output form the premotor cortex 
It is well known (Dum and Strick, 1991) that the hand representation of the primary motor 
cortex  (areas M1 or F1) receives a strong input from area F5. However, early studies 
testing the mirror properties of neurons located in area F1 yielded negative results 
(Gallese et al., 1996). Recently, in a series of experiments on the mirror properties of the 
cortico-spinal tract neurons (Kraskov et al., 2009; Vigneswaran et al., 2013) demonstrated 
that many of these neurons respond to the observation of actions done by others.  
 A first study examined the activity of cortico-spinal neurons originating from area 
F5. They found that the discharge of about half of the tested neurons was modulated by 
grasping observation. Interestingly, the discharge rates of about 25% of these neurons 
were not increased, but rather suppressed during observation (Kraskov et al., 2009). 
A second study investigated the responses of cortico-spinal neurons originating 
from area F1 (Vigneswaran et al., 2013) . About half of the tested neurons were modulated 
by action observation. Among these neurons, most increased their discharge rates during 
observation, while others reduced their discharge rates, or even stopped firing. A 
comparison between the properties of cortico-spinal F1 and F5 mirror neurons showed 
that the visual responses in F1 were much weaker than in F5. Thus, although many 
cortico-spinal F1 neurons fire during action observation, their input to spinal circuitry is 
weak and insufficient to produce movement. 
These data are of great importance because they indicate that the understanding of 
goals of motor behaviour might not be simply a function of F5 mirror neurons, but rather 
is based on complex motor representations that involve even corticospinal tract neurons. 
This again indicates the weakness of the classical conceptualization of strictly hierarchical 
processing, here in terms of a separation between motor programming (in premotor 
cortex) and processes of motor control that are associated with area F1 and the cortico-
spinal tract.    
 
Theoretical models with explicit mathematical implementations 
While a wide spectrum of conceptual models for action processing exists, we focus here 
only on models with explicit mathematical implementations since we think that they will 
be most useful for narrowing down underlying computational mechanisms. In addition, 
space constraints do not allow us to extend the discussion to several interesting aspects 
that have been extensively discussed in the context of conceptual models. This includes: (i) 
the relationship between action processing, mirror neurons, and the representation of 
language (Arbib, 2005; Pulvermuller, 2005; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998); (ii) the issue of how 
mirror neurons emerge in terms of learning and evolution (Cook et al., 2014; Keysers and 
Perrett, 2004); (iii) the relationship between action processing and social cognition (Gallese 
et al., 2004; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008; Spaulding, 2013); (iv) philosophical aspects, 
such as how mirror neurons are related to mind reading (Keysers and Gazzola, 2007), the 
awareness of self and others, or empathy (e.g. Oberman and Ramachandran, 2007; 
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008). While such aspects are of broad general interest, the 
presently available neural data seems not sufficient to constrain mathematically 
implemented computational models on these aspects.   
Before starting our review of existing models it seems important to discuss briefly 
the role of models in neuroscience, and specifically in the field of action recognition. There 
exists a heterogeneous spectrum of understandings about the function of theories in 
cognitive neuroscience, which ranges from quantitative, exactly-defined mathematical 
models (e.g. for biophysical processes in neurons, or about relationships between 
psychophysical variables that can be accurately measured) up to conceptual post-hoc 
discussions and box-and-arrow models, summing up speculative claims with relevance 
for subsets of data. Since in action recognition already a vast number of speculative 
explanations exist we think that this field might profit more from theory concept that is 
similar to the one physics. According to this, a theory should link quantitatively different 
variables, for which one can specify an exact method how they are measured. This seems 
not to apply to a variety of popular concepts in the field of action perception (such as 
‘intention’, ‘empathy’, ‘mind’, etc.), and for this reason we do not discuss them in this 
paper.  The quantitative link to data might be made at different levels, e.g. at a behavioral 
level or even by explaining or predicting the behavior of individual neurons. 
Phenomenological models that relate different behavioral variables are important and 
often help to delineate fundamental computational problems and principles. Yet, usually 
they do not uniquely specify the neural mechanisms that implement such computations. 
For this, more detailed models including details about the processing in neurons or 
neuron populations are required. In addition, it is possible that certain computations 
cannot be efficiently implemented with real neurons. It is thus a nontrivial step to claim 
that a computationally efficient algorithm, e.g. in computer vision, really has a relevance 
for the brain. For this, at least at some point, one has to show how the postulated 
computations can be implemented by neurons with biophysically plausible properties, 
and it has to be verified if the resulting predicted behavior of neurons matches 
electrophysiological data. This conception of different levels of theory in neuroscience 
matches the classical distinction of levels of analysis that has been proposed by D. Marr 
(1982) for computational vision.  
 The existing theoretical approaches in the focus of this review fall in three main 
categories. The first tries to implement the “direct matching hypothesis” (Rizzolatti and 
Fogassi, 2014; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010), thus the hypothesis that action recognition 
and understanding exploits  motor-representations of the observed action (see above).  
 The second category tries to explain action recognition and understanding using 
predictive Bayesian models, assuming an interplay of sensory representations and their 
validation via top-down predictions from higher-level representations that encode 
underlying causes or motor states, including action goals.  
 The third class of approaches are visual pattern recognition models that accomplish 
action recognition by the identification of visual feature sequences, without making 
reference to the motor system. These approaches account for visual action recognition, but 
not for the observed interactions between vision and motor execution.  
 We try to focus here mainly on novel approaches and refer to classical models only 
to the degree that is necessary to understand the conceptual basis of the more recent 
approaches.- 
 
  
Classical models based on artificial neural networks 
The first implemented models for action processing and mirror systems were based on 
artificial neural networks. These models are important since they demonstrated that 
computational problems related to action processing and the mirror neuron system could 
be implemented and solved mathematically. However, these models typically do not 
claim that the proposed implementations reproduce detailed properties of cortical neurons. 
This puts these approaches between conceptual models and models that reproduce details 
of the physiology of the action processing system.  
Among the first and most influential work using artificial neural networks are the seminal 
models by Arbib and co-workers (Bonaiuto et al., 2007; Oztop and Arbib, 2002). Using 
architectures that are coarsely inspired by the connectivity between the different parts of the action 
processing network (e.g. the STS, parietal areas such as AIP or IPS (intraparietal sulcus), or LIP 
(lateral intraparietal cortex), premotor areas such as F5, and primary motor cortex), and 
implementing individual computational modules using classical neural network techniques 
(including back-propagation), these models accomplish the recognition of grips and trajectory 
prediction. Action recognition is accomplished by the learning of mappings between visual features 
and features characterizing the goal object and its affordances (i.e. the way how it has to be 
manipulated), and between visual features and hand states, that characterize the hand configuration 
during grasping. The temporal sequence of hand states can then be exploited to recognize the action. 
The newer version of the model includes also an auditory pathway in order to model the 
multimodality of mirror neurons (Kohler et al., 2002), and it accounts for the fact that mirror 
neurons respond during partially occluded actions (Umilta et al., 2001). In addition, these 
architectures have been linked to controller models (Oztop et al., 2006). , and recently they have 
been extended by mechanism for monitoring of the possibility to execute actions and of the values 
of their outcomes (Bonaiuto and Arbib, 2010). A similar theoretical approach is also followed by 
models of other groups, such as the TROPICAL model (Caligiore et al., 2010), which exploits a 
variety of classical neural network techniques (including also Kohonen maps, neural fields, and 
hierarchical object recognition architectures) in order to model behavioral results on stimulus 
response compatibility.  Others have applied classical neural network techniques to account for the 
problem how different action perspectives might be  matched during the learning of mirror neurons 
(Schrodt et al., 2014). 
 
Models based on controller architectures 
Another class of classical models implementing the direct matching hypothesis has been 
derived from controller architectures that have been developed to account for motor 
contol. These behavioral models typically combine two types of dynamical internal 
models that model parts of the sensorimotor loop (Demiris and Khadhouri, 2006; Wolpert 
et al., 2003): 1) Forward models that compute predictions for state changes of the motor 
system and associated sensory signals from the motor command, where it is assumed that 
the brain sends a copy of the motor control signal as input to the forward model 
(reafference). 2) Inverse models that map sensory signals directly to appropriate control 
signals. This makes it possible to accomplish fast control in situations where the signals for 
feedback control are too slow. A prominent implementation of this approach is the 
MOSAIC architecture (Haruno et al., 2001), which combines multiple controllers for 
different behaviors (each consisting of a forward and inverse model) that are operating in 
parallel within a mixture of experts architecture (Figure 2A). The final control signal is 
determined by weighting of the outputs of the expert controllers, dependent on the sizes 
of their prediction errors with respect to the available sensory signals. As consequence, the 
outputs of the controllers that best predict the sensory inputs signals have the highest 
weights. It has been postulated that the MOSAIC model also explains the perception of 
actions and social behaviors, assuming that movements are classified by determining the 
controller module that produces the smallest prediction error (Wolpert et al., 2003). 
Controller-based models have been embedded in hierarchical architectures with a lower 
level that is formed by the expert controller modules for different actions and a top level 
that controls their contribution, allowing for the generation of action sequences (Haruno, 
2003) .  
  Mirror neurons have been  associated  specifically with  the  implementation  of  the 
forward models  in such control architectures  (Oztop et al., 2006), and  the parietal cortex 
has been proposed as being  involved  in  the representation of  the  inverse models  (Miall, 
2003).  In addition,  it seems  likely  that subcortical structures, such as  the cerebellum, are 
involved in the implementation of the relevant internal models (Caligiore et al., 2013).  
Controller-based approaches have been very successful in accounting for 
behavioral data and have motivated many behavioral experiments. The way how such 
controllers are implemented in terms of cortical and subcortical circuits is not entirely 
clear. However, the idea of predictive control and of internal models that predict sensory 
consequences is dominating the present discussion about action encoding in cognitive 
neuroscience. The same concepts are presently frequently discussed in the context of 
predictive coding theories (see also Section ‘Bayesian Models’). Another important 
concept is the idea of hierarchical representation of actions, which also has been 
postulated on the basis of human imaging data (Grafton and Hamilton, 2007).  
A computational problem is that controller models often assume an internal 
simulation of motor programs in joint angle space, without specifying how such motor-
relevant variables can be efficiently extracted from retinal image sequences. In robotics 
this difficult computational vision problem is typically bypassed by use of computer 
vision systems or special sensors that are not biologically plausible. Another problem for 
models that try to identify motor control policies from observation (Schaal2003) is that the 
dynamics of observed actors often does not match the one of the observer, for example 
because the observer has a different body geometry or masses of the body segments. This 
leads to a nontrivial correspondence problem, where one has to find a mapping between the 
movements or control policies of agents with different physical properties (Dautenhahn, 
2001). 
 
 
 
Dynamic recurrent neural networks and neural field models 
Another class of action processing models with closer relationships to brain functions is 
based on recurrent neural networks and neural fields. Neural fields are space-continuous 
recurrent neural network models that describe the dynamics of distributed activation 
patterns in the nervous system. Opposed to large-scale models with discrete neurons that 
in certain cases they permit a mathematical analysis and understanding of the emerging 
activity patterns.  Recently such models are also often discussed under the term  ‘neural 
mass models’ (e.g. Deco et al., 2011). They describe the dynamic variation of the average 
activity of ensembles of cortical neurons with similar tuning properties (mean-field 
approximation). This makes them suitable to establish links to detailed mechanisms at the 
level of real neuron ensembles. Neural fields have been used to account for action 
recognition and for mirror representations. 
 Influential models based on recurrent neural networks have proposed by Tani and 
colleagues (Tani et al., 2004). The networks are trained in a supervised manner with pairs 
of sensory and motor signals. The trained networks can predict trajectories from 
incomplete sensor information. This class of models has been extended towards dynamic 
hierarchical representations, where the top level represents the sequential order of actions, 
while the lower levels represent the trajectories of the individual actions. More recently, 
such models have been extended by inclusion of neuron pools with multiple time scales, 
forming a hierarchy (Yamashita and Tani, 2008). The models of the Tani group have been 
tested extensively for movement generation and recognition in humanoid robots, showing 
that they scale to up for complex real-world problems. This shows the feasibility of action 
representation with such recurrent network architectures. The developed networks are not 
aiming at reproducing detailed properties of cortical neurons, while it appears that by 
appropriate modification of these models this might be possible. By linking perceptual 
and motor representations such models address mirror representations.  
 A second class of biologically-motivated dynamical network models is based on 
dynamic neural fields (Amari, 1977; Wilson and Cowan, 1972). Dynamic neural fields have 
been proposed as physiologically-inspired models for the distributed representation of 
motor programs, as well as for the self-organization of perceptual patterns, e.g. in low-
level vision (Dayan and Abbott, 2001; Erlhagen and Schöner, 2002; Giese, 1999).  For 
appropriate choice of the lateral connectivity, neural fields can have stable solutions that 
correspond to temporally propagating localized activity pulses. Such propagating pulse 
solutions can be used to model the sequential activation of neurons that encode different 
motor states, or instances along a trajectory. This mechanism has been proposed for the 
encoding of motor programs as well as for the encoding of perceived visual pattern 
sequences (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Giese and Poggio, 2003; Zhang, 1996). Neural fields 
have also been used to account for the interaction between movement recognition and 
action planning in robotics (Erlhagen et al., 2006; Sauser and Billard, 2006) For example, 
the STS, and cortical areas PF and F5 have been modelled by dynamically coupled neural 
fields with highly simplified inputs (Erlhagen et al., 2006). In addition, it was 
demonstrated that the required coupling between such neural fields can be learned with a 
Hebbian learning rule, providing a possible implementation for the hypothesis that mirror 
circuits might result from Hebbian plasticity during self-observation (Keysers and Perrett, 
2004).  
 Neural field models have been directly compared to neural data in motor and 
premotor cortex  (e.g. Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Erlhagen et al., 1999). A major limitation of 
the discussed neural field model for mirror representations is that they use highly 
simplified low-dimensional input and motor patterns. This leaves open whether the 
proposed architectures, and the associated nonlinear dynamics, scales up to perceptual 
and motor patterns with realistic dimensionality. (See below an application of neural fields 
for action perception from real videos.)  
 Closely related to neural field models are models for ‘motor chains’ (Chersi et al., 
2011). These models are directly motivated by electrophysiological experiments in 
premotor and parietal cortex. They consist of ensembles of spiking neurons models that 
encode different phases of actions (e.g. reaching, grasping, and bringing to the mouth), 
and which are dynamically coupled in a way that results a sequential activation, 
representing the sequential order of the temporal phases of the action. This property 
reproduces the fact that neurons, e.g. in premotor cortex, often are tuned for individual 
grip phases and show activation only during the relevant phase. It is assumed that the 
ensembles receive input from motor as well as from visual structures, and that the first 
ensemble is excited by an external ensemble that encodes intention (potentially 
represented in prefrontal cortex). The activity of this external ensemble initiates the 
sequential activation of the chain of ensembles. This mechanism is thus very similar to the 
propagation of a localized activation pulse in a neural field (see above). The intention 
ensemble receives feedback input form the corresponding motor chain, resulting in an 
activation of the corresponding intention representation when a motor behavior is 
observed or executed.  
Chain models have a high degree of physiological plausibility and are thus suitable 
for a detailed comparison with real neural data. So far the models have been tested only 
with idealized low-dimensional peak-shaped input signals, which leaves the question 
open whether such models and their dynamics generalize to pattern spaces with realistic 
complexity.  
 
 
Bayesian models 
Another extremely popular class of models is based on Bayesian probabilistic inference. A 
first simple Bayesian model for action classification has been proposed in the context of a 
robotics system (Metta et al., 2006). It postulates that different parts of the mirror neuron 
system correspond to the components of a Bayesian action classifier and accomplishes 
classifications of hand actions from video input, using a computer-vision input model that 
is not biologically plausible.  
 Another very influential Bayesian action recognition model has been proposed by 
Friston and colleagues (Friston et al., 2011; Kilner et al., 2007), based on the idea of 
‘predictive coding’ (Friston, 2010). This models picks up a variety of principles from the 
theories discussed before: (i) formulation of parts of the sensorimotor loop as predictive 
dynamical systems; (ii) the minimization of the prediction error in sensory space; (iii) use 
of nonlinear dynamical systems, and specifically of sequentially activated chains of 
neurons (called ‘stable heteroclinic channels’ in this literature) for the encoding of the 
sequential time structure of actions; (iv) dynamical hierarchies, specifying actions at 
different levels of abstraction, and with a bottom-up and top-down exchange of 
information. These elements are combined within a brain theory, derived from machine 
learning and theoretical physics, which postulates that circuits in the brain realize a special 
form of belief-propagation algorithm. According to this interpretation, the brain estimates 
hidden variables (including internal dynamical states and intentions) based on sensory 
observations, where it exploits a probabilistic hierarchical dynamical generative model in 
order to specify how the sensory signals depend on external causes, and on the internal 
state variables of the brain. The parameters and variables of this probabilistic  model are 
estimated using a Bayesian approach, combining prior distributions for the estimated  
variables with likelihoods. The likelihoods specify how the variables at individual 
hierarchy levels are statistically related to prediction errors for the variables in the next-
lower level of the hierarchy. The likelihoods define thus a bottom-up stream of 
information within the hierarchy. In addition, it is assumed that the priors at the different 
levels are estimated by top-down predictions from the next higher level in the hierarchy 
(implementing a special form of ‘empirical Bayes’, where prior distributions are also 
estimated by maximizing consistency of the model with the data). This defines a top-down 
stream of information within the hierarchy. The approach makes it in principle possible to 
estimate all model parameters by minimizing the prediction error (more precisely the 
surprise or entropy) in the space of the sensory signals. 
  The underlying parameter estimation problem cannot be solved exactly because it 
becomes intractable, even for relatively low-dimensional problems (a frequent problem in 
Bayesian inference). This problem can be circumvented by minimizing not the real 
prediction error, but an upper bound that depends on it (‘free energy’).  This bound is 
formulated using an approximative distribution for the hidden variables that results in a 
tractable problem (‘variational Bayesian inference’). A key assumption in the theory is that 
this approximative distribution is Gaussian (which can be motivated by a ‘Laplace 
approximation’ for the underlying true distributions). With these assumptions it is 
possible to derive an algorithm that minimizes the free energy bound by a gradient 
descent.  The gradient descent algorithm can be implemented as message passing 
procedure, where signals are exchanged within a network that consists of hierarchically 
connected ‘nodes‘.  The idea is that these nodes can be mapped onto neurons or neuron 
ensembles. The proposed message passing procedure specifies exactly which signals are 
exchanged between the nodes, and how these signals are computed within the nodes 
(Friston, 2005).  
  It has been speculated that the mirror neuron system and action perception might 
be understood within this framework (Kilner et al., 2007). Action control and recognition 
using this idea have been implemented for simple examples with a two-degree of freedom 
arm (Friston et al., 2011; Friston et al., 2010). In addition, it has been demonstrated (for 
artificial simulated birdsongs) that the framework allows the learning of hierarchical 
models that represent dynamical signals at multiple time-scales (Kiebel et al., 2008; Kiebel 
et al., 2009).  
 The theory proposed by Friston clearly addresses mirror mechanisms since it 
specifies how sensory and motor representations are interacting, and since intermediate 
levels of the hierarchy combine visual and motor signals. Opposed to speculative 
frameworks, the implemented versions of the free-energy framework by Friston have the 
advantage that they make precise predictions about the exchanged neural signals and the 
computations in neurons ensembles that correspond to individual nodes. Such predictions 
can be tested by comparison with electrophysiological data. However, the detailed 
evaluation of such predictions is far from accomplished. Some aspects of the free energy 
framework are also common to many other theories (e.g. hierarchy, asymmetry of bottom 
up and top-down connections, sequence encoding by neural state dynamics). Other 
aspects are more specific, and some predictions about the signal flow across cortical layers 
seem to match observations in real neurons (Bastos et al., 2012). Other aspects seem not to 
be in agreement with electrophysiological data, at least in action selective neurons. An 
example is the prediction that cortical neurons ensembles only encode unimodal 
distributions (because of the necessity to assume Gaussian distributions for the message 
passing algorithm) (Friston, 2008). A further issue is that it is not clear if for realistically 
complex pattern spaces the belief propagation iteration can be finished sufficiently fast in 
order to account for the observed rather low neural latencies. Action-selective neurons in 
area F5 can have latencies as short as 60 ms (Maranesi et al., 2014), and the average 
latencies are not much larger than 100 ms. This is not so much more than the sum of the 
synaptic delays from the retina to these neurons, leaving not much time for convergence 
of complex inference algorithms or optimization schemes. It has been discussed that a part 
of this convergence processes might happen during evolution. However, in order to go 
beyond speculation, it would be important to implement the proposed theory for patterns 
with realistic complexity and then to show that by pre-training one can build a system that 
can realize the remaining inference steps sufficiently fast. It remains thus an exciting and 
challenging topic to verify if the predictions of predictive coding account are really 
consistent with the properties of real cortical neurons.   
 
Example-based visual recognition models 
A further class of action recognition models takes a completely different approach from 
previously discussed theories, conceptualizing action recognition as a purely visual 
pattern recognition process. Such approaches account also for action recognition in cases 
where the observer is lacking of motor representations of the observed behavior (e.g. 
observation of a flying bird, or a dog barking). These theories were motivated by learning-
based object recognition models (review see  Tarr and Bulthoff, 1998) that accomplish 
invariant object recognition by learning example views. Likewise, action recognition can 
be accomplished by learning to recognize sequences of visual patterns that are derived 
from retinal image sequences. The key for the efficiency of such systems is to accomplish 
invariance of the learned representations against parameters that are not relevant for the 
recognition (e.g. position, view, unimportant kinematic details, etc.). Almost all technical 
approaches for the robust visual detection and recognition of actions in computer vision 
and robotics are based on the learning of visual patterns (e.g. Moeslund et al., 2006), 
demonstrating the feasibility of this approach for real-world problems. 
 Example-based physiologically-inspired neural action recognition models have first 
been proposed for the recognition of non-transitive actions without goal objects. The 
developed models consist of hierarchies of feature detectors that mimic the properties of 
neurons at different levels of the visual pathway, from primary visual cortex, over 
intermediate levels such as area V4, up to the STS  (Giese and Poggio, 2003; Lange and 
Lappe, 2006). Invariance is accomplished by pooling the responses from size-, position-, or 
view-specific detectors at higher levels of the hierarchy (e.g. Riesenhuber and Poggio, 
1999).  The recognition of actions can be accomplished either by recognizing sequences of 
body shapes, or by the recognition of sequences of associated optic flow patterns, where 
likely the brain integrates both feature types in recognition. Neural fields, implementing a 
predictive dynamics with a stable travelling pulse solution, have been proposed as 
physiologically plausible mechanism for the recognition of feature sequences (Giese and 
Poggio, 2003), next to other schemes for spatio-temporal integration. While such example-
based hierarchical visual recognition models have been originally developed as models for 
cortical processing, they have been extended to applications in computer vision, achieving 
competitive performance with state-of-the-art computer vision algorithms (Escobar and 
Kornprobst, 2008; Jhuang et al., 2007; Schindler et al., 2008). 
 Very recently, computer vision has developed a strong interest in such hierarchical 
neural network architectures, discussed under the labels ‘deep learning architectures’ or 
‘convolutional neural networks’. This interest was initiated by the fact that such 
architectures outperformed other algorithms, first for  object recognition  (LeCun et al., 
2015), but later also for many other computer vision problems including action 
classification (Karpathy et al., 2014; Le et al., 2011). Such deep architectures are presently 
among the best performing solutions for action classifications from real videos in 
computer vision. Recently, also deep architectures including dynamical neurons which 
learn hierarchical spatio-temporal representations have been proposed (Jung et al., 2015). 
Many details of the existing deep architectures (applied filter kernel, training schemes, 
regularization by ‘drop out’, etc.) are not biologically plausible, so that it would be a 
superficial conclusion to link them directly to real cortical neurons. However, it has been 
shown that appropriately trained and constrained deep learning architectures can develop 
neurons during learning whose tuning properties resemble the ones of neurons in areas 
V4 and IT (inferotemporal cortex)  (Yamins et al., 2014). In addition, new methods for the 
analysis of the tuning properties of neurons on the intermediate layers of such hierarchies 
have been developed that might become interesting for the analysis of neural data 
(Karpathy et al., 2015; Zeiler and Fergus, 2014). Finally, some recent work also tries to 
develop a theoretical understanding why hierarchical (deep) architectures have so 
favorable generalization properties (Anselmi et al., 2015). 
 Recently, physiologically-inspired example-based recognition models have also 
been extended for the recognition of transitive goal-directed actions, such as the 
manipulation of objects with the hand. This requires a modeling of additional 
computations, potentially realized parietal areas, that analyze the shape and position of 
goal objects and the relationship between object and the effector movements. One model 
of this type reproduces a variety of electrophysiological results from action-selective 
neurons in the STS and premotor area F5, at the same time accomplishing recognition 
from real videos (Fleischer et al., 2013) (see Figure 2B). This model reproduces, for 
example, the view-dependence of action-selective neurons (see Section ‘Some newly 
established  properties of mirror neurons in area F5’), their temporal sequence-selectivity, 
and predicts are relationship between mirror neurons and mechanisms for causality 
perception (Fleischer et al., 2012). Other models of this type have been tested in robotics, 
accomplishing for example the recognition of grip apertures, affordances, or hand action 
classification (Prevete et al., 2008; Tessitore et al., 2010).   
 Since this class of model was derived, taking into account the tuning properties of 
cortical neurons, they make predictions about the behavior of individual neurons and 
motivate novel electrophysiological experiments. The fact that these models have been 
successfully tested with real videos provides evidence that they are computationally 
powerful. A shortcoming of most models of this type is that they have a pure feed forward 
architecture and largely do not include top-down effects. However, it has been shown that 
top-down connections can be added to such architectures, and under appropriate 
circumstances can improve recognition performance (Layher, 2013). Example-based-vision 
models do not account for the well-established interactions between action vision and 
action execution (review Schutz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007) since they do not include motor 
representations. However, it seems straight-forward to extend these architectures by 
layers that represent motor programs (e.g. using neural fields) and to implement dynamic 
couplings between neural vison-based and such motor representations in order to account 
for mirror properties. However, presently no electrophysiological data is available that 
would allow to constrain the exact form of this coupling.  
 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
This paper reviewed recent neurophysiological experiments on action recognition that 
define constraints for the development of future computational and neural theories of 
action recognition. Most importantly, the combination of anatomical and fMRI studies has 
established homologies between the action recognition system in humans and monkeys 
that justify comparisons between both species. In addition, this work has delineated the 
major pathways that are involved in action recognition, including specifically the STS, 
parietal cortex and premotor cortex.  
 Mirror representations with neurons that combine defined visual and motor tuning 
properties have been found specifically in parietal and premotor cortex, and to a less 
degree also in other structures, like the primary motor cortex. What is less clear and sets a 
challenge for future theory-experiment collaborations, is the characterization of the 
specific computational roles of these different regions. This problem is non-trivial because 
the correspondence between different necessary computational steps and these neural 
structures is typically fuzzy, and often neurons with similar tuning properties are found in 
different regions. In addition, electrophysiological studies, trying systematically to 
establish the communality and differences between the properties of action-selective 
neurons, and especially mirror neurons, in different areas are largely lacking. Such studies 
will be essential to make substantiated assignments between different cortical areas and 
computational steps postulated in computational and neural models.  
It is of interest to stress that recent research in neurophysiology shows a shift towards a 
much more quantitative characterization of the underlying representations, for example  
using movie stimuli with controlled timing, or specific parametric variations,. Such well-
controlled parametric manipulations are an important step towards the generation of data 
that can be linked to detailed quantitative computational and neural models.   
In addition, we tried to give an overview of the theoretical models that are implemented 
mathematically so that their behavior can be meaningfully compared with 
electrophysiological experiments. The comparison between physiological data and 
existing implemented models reveals several shortcomings of the existing theoretical 
frameworks, as well as of the available experimental approaches. Some of these 
shortcomings are listed in Box 2. 
Coarsely speaking, the major limitation of the presently available theories is that they are 
either only computational, not giving details about the neural implementation of specific 
mechanisms, or they are limited to specific functions in action recognition (e.g. accounting 
only for the visual tuning of relevant neuron populations). In the field of visual object 
recognition, meanwhile, very developed neural theories exist that have been associated 
with detailed neural data at multiple levels.. The field of action recognition is much less 
developed in this regard.  No physiologically plausible model that integrates visual and 
motor representations by biophysically plausible mechanisms exists. While the number of 
hierarchical models for action classification (including deep architectures) is growing, it is 
less clear how to link such architectures to semantic aspects of actions that seem to be 
important for the brain (e.g. the matching between classes of objects and effector 
movements, or to different actions subserving the same goal). Also no systematic 
theoretical understanding exists how to control the learning processes in such 
architectures. A further problem is how cortical neural mechanisms for action recognition 
interacts with subcortical processes, e.g. in the cerebellum or oin the basal ganglia, and 
what are the computational advantages of this interaction. These problems set novel 
theoretical challenges, including the questions how the relevant computations can be 
implemented neurally.  
 Bridging the existing gaps between theory and experiments seems to necessitate 
new developments in experimental as well as in theoretical neuroscience. On the 
theoretical side, the clarification of the detailed neuro-computational mechanisms requires 
the development of theories that are close to real neurons. Purely computational models 
are not sufficiently constraining to verify such mechanisms in detail. This obviously makes 
it necessary to take into account and understand the mathematical details of such models. 
Just using theoretical approaches as black-box and speculating about how they might 
explain data will not be sufficient to find out whether they are really implemented by 
neurons. In addition, models have to be tested with realistic stimulus sets to verify their 
computational limits. Two decades of experience in machine learning and brain-inspired 
computing demonstrate that often apparently exciting algorithms did not scale up for real-
world problems, which makes it unlikely that the brain exploits these algorithms, since it 
faces the same computational challenges as technical applications..   
 On the side of experimental research, more experiments need to be developed that 
test specific computational mechanisms and operations. Novel methodological approaches, 
such as techniques for the simultaneous recordings of large number of neurons and  
optogenetic approaches for the causal manipulation of the activity in specific classes of 
neurons likely will be helpful for this purpose. Such techniques might help to clarify 
central questions, like how the different types of invariance properties (e.g. with respect to 
view, action, actor, or the affordances of different objects) are jointly encoded in ensembles 
of action-selective neurons, and how different areas contribute to these invariances. 
Likewise, multi-unit recordings and simultaneous recordings in multiple relevant areas, 
and specific cortical layers, might help to clarify the information flow between layers. This 
will help to understand the role of different pathways in the action processing system (e.g. 
between the STS and area F5 (Nelissen et al., 2011)), and it will help to validate specific 
models, such as message passing accounts for bottom-up and top-down processing.    
 For the near future, it appears clearly feasible to further characterize the tuning 
properties of neurons (e.g. with respect to space, timing, and in terms of parameters 
characterizing the object-effector relationship) in the action processing network, using 
parametrically highly-controlled stimuli generated by computer graphics. In addition, 
machine learning techniques (including classifiers or visualization techniques  for neurons 
at intermediate levels of hierarchies) might  help to analyze the distributed representation 
of relevant parameters in populations of action-selective neurons. Likewise, it seems 
possible to test specific predictions about local computations according to predictive 
coding theories in comparison with electrophysiological data. Another interesting 
question, which might be addressed by pharmacological or optogenetic techniques in 
combination with theoretical modelling, is how critical different parts of the cortical action 
processing network are for different tasks, and how cortical and subcortical structures 
interact during action recognition (Caligiore et al., 2013).  
In terms of theoretical approaches, it seems feasible to extend existing hierarchical and 
deep-learning approaches by inclusion of layers that represent semantic aspects, such as 
the relationships between different classes of actions and goal objects.  In addition, the 
realization of bottom up and top-down connections within such hierarchies is important. 
While predictive coding theory suggests one approach to implement such connections, 
there are many other possibilities, including ones directly derived from neural data. Such 
architectures will be suitable for the modeling of the interaction between action 
recognition and attention, and also to capture the observed modulation of neuron activity 
by reward expectations.   
Summarizing, it appears that only progress along both lines, experiments and the 
development of new theoretical frameworks, will ultimately result in a satisfying 
understanding of the mechanisms of action processing. Once such a deeper understanding 
for the core problem of action processing is accomplished, one might start to explore the 
interesting question whether relevant computational principles also apply to other 
cognitive phenomena, as postulated in existing speculative accounts about the relevance 
of mirror mechanisms for emotion processing,  empathy, or social cognition. 
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Box 1: What we know 
 
 The recognition and understanding  of actions of others that  belong to the motor 
repertoire of the observer involves an activation of the observer’s  motor 
representations in addition to  a visual analysis of the observed actions.  
 The recognition and understanding of others’ actions, which are not part of the 
motor repertoire of the observer, is based on visual analysis of the stimuli and 
subsequent inferential processes.   
 Mirror representations of others’ action are not limited to simple hand, mouth and 
leg actions but include complex actions (e.g. climbing) and emotional behaviors (e.g 
Abdollahi et al. (2013)). 
 Visual processing of actions can be accomplished robustly by the learning of 
hierarchies of detectors with appropriate mechanisms for the encoding of 
invariance. 
 Several computational approaches addressing mechanisms and relevant processes 
in action recognition and understanding are available. 
 
Box 2: What we need to know / what is missing 
 
 We do not have a clear understanding how computations are distributed between 
different cortical areas. (For example, are there different computational roles of 
mirror neurons in parietal, premotor and motor cortex?) 
 How do cortical and subcortical structures interact in action recognition? 
 A variety of models implements necessary computational steps by non-biological 
algorithms. Future work needs to focus on verifying implementations in terms of 
physiologically plausible mechanisms by detailed comparison with physiological 
data.   
 Some theories make strong assumptions about available preprocessed inputs, 
bypassing non-trivial computational problems. Unless it can be found out how the 
brain solves these non-trivial computational problems, these approaches might not 
be relevant for the brain.  
 Some theories have been implemented only for toy examples for highly simplified 
pattern spaces and ignoring constraints in terms of computation time. Valid 
theories need to scale up to sensory and motor patterns of realistic complexity and 
need to result in solutions with realistic computation times, taking into account the 
processing constraints of real neurons.  
 Some models cover only partial aspects of action recognition and understanding, 
such as purely visual processing. These approaches have to be extended by 
working out possible links to motor and other related brain structures.   
 While some of the discussed experimental results, such as view-tuning, activation 
of mirror neurons by occluded stimuli, etc., are captured by some of the existing 
models, most of the discussed new experimental results, such as the modulation of 
activity by operational distance or expected reward, are not. 
 The existing experimental results often are not appropriate to distinguish 
sufficiently between different possible theoretical explanations. Experiments have 
to be designed that aim at distinguishing different theoretical explanations (for 
example message passing vs. activity changes as predicted by recurrent neural 
network  models).  
.  
  
Figure captions: 
 
Figure 1. Action observation network:  A) Lateral view of a macaque brain showing the 
locations of three region (STS, Intraparietal sulcus region- IPS, Inferior arcuate sulcus 
region- IAS) involved in action observation. B) Flattened representation of STS, IPS, and 
IAS. FEF (frontal eye fields). Visual information on observed actions is sent from STS 
through parietal cortex to area F5 along two functional routes indicated with red and blue 
arrows, respectively. Area 45B receives parietal input from LIP and also has direct 
connections with the lower bank of STS (green arrows). For further abbreviations, see text. 
(Modified from Nelissen et al. 2011).  
Figure 2. Examples of models for the visual recognition of goal-directed actions that 
illustrate different theoretical principles. (A) Model based on a motor control architecture, 
such as the MOSAIC model. Different controllers are responsible for the different actions, 
such as walking and kicking. Forward models compute the predicted sensory signals from 
the corresponding motor commands. The control model with the smallest prediction error 
in the sensory domain determines the classified actions (‘kicking’) (modified from Wolpert 
et al., 2003). (B) Example-based visual recognition model for hand actions. The model 
consists of neural detectors that mimic properties of cortical neurons. It comprises three 
modules: (a) shape recognition hierarchy that recognizes hand and object shapes; (b) 
‘affordance module’ that analyses the matching between grip type and objects shape and 
their spatial parameters; (c) recognition module that consists of neurons that are selective 
for goal-directed hand actions. View-independence is generated at the highest level of the 
hierarchy by pooling the output signals from view-specific modules (modified from 
Fleischer et al., 2013). 
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